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Chill: Political Gerrymandering

POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING:
WAS ELBRIDGE GERRY RIGHT?
C. Daniel Chill *
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a process known as redistricting, electoral districts are
reconfigured following each decennial census to account for
population shifts since the previous census. 1 While a variety of factors
inform the placement of new district lines, partisan considerations,
notably incumbency protection, loom large. That the contours of
electoral units are politically motivated is a matter of controversy.
Partisan redistricting—and its concomitant objective of
protecting incumbents—is assailed by good government
groups as undemocratic and fundamentally unfair. Good
government groups such as Common Cause, 2 The League of Women

*

Professor of Law and Political Science, Touro College
Such redistricting is required by the constitutional principle of one person/one vote
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) and
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2 New York Common Cause, Comments by Common Cause/NY to the Senate Standing
Committee On Election, (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.commoncause.org/policy-andlitigation/testimony/NY_101209_Comments_Election_Reform_Senate.pdf
(“Common
Cause/New York is a nonpartisan citizens’ lobby and a leading force in the battle for honest
and accountable government. Common Cause fights to strengthen public participation and
faith in our institutions of self-government and to ensure that government and political
processes serve the general interest, and not simply the special interests.”). “Can the Plan”:
How the 2012 Redistricting Deal Denies New Yorkers Fair Representation and the
Fundamentally
Flawed
Redistrcting
“Reform”,
NYPIRG
(June
2014),
http://www.nypirg.org/pubs/goodgov/2014.06.23Redistricting-CanthePlan/cantheplan.pdf.
“Consonant with our overall mission we have consistently worked . . . to improve
accessibility, accuracy, transparency, and verifiability in our democratic process at the city,
state and national level.” Testimony of Susan Lerner Executive Director, Common Cause/NY
Before the New York City Council Committees on Civil Rights and on Immigration Regarding
Joing Public Hearing on Census Issues, N.Y. COMMON CAUSE (Nov. 20, 2009),
http://www.commoncause.org/policyandlitigation/testimony/NY_112009_SusanLerner_Test
imony.pdf.
1
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Voters, 3 New York PIRG, 4 and The Brennan Center, 5 as well as
newspapers as diverse as The New York Times, 6 and Milwaukee
Wisconsin Journal Sentinel 7 have engaged in a crusade against partisan
redistricting. Joining these advocates of restraints on partisan political
line drawing are a plethora of academicians both legal and non-legal.
Critics maintain that the Holy Grail of effective government is
legislative turnover, achieved either by eliminating lengthy terms for
legislators (term limits) 8 and/or through non-partisan drawing of
legislative districts.
This author maintains that despite its derision by academicians
and good government groups, partisan redistricting aimed at protecting
incumbents not only is not pernicious, but in fact, results in a preferred
legislative product. As will be shown, this counterintuitive conclusion
is impelled by considered judicial authority as well as a measure of
reasoned scholarly analysis.
Part II provides an overview of the debate over the role of
political partisanship in the district drawing process. Part III discusses
the jurisprudence of redistricting protective of incumbents. Part IV

3 At a public hearing before the New York State Legislative Task Force on Demographic
Research and Reapportionment (“LATFOR”), representatives of The League of Women
Voters testified as follows: “The League is a non-partisan organization which encourages
informed and active involvement in government and influences public policy through
education and advocacy . . . . The public wants an independent commission – not LATFOR –
to draw state legislative and congressional district boundaries . . . . “ Testimony Before the
Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment, LMV: THE LEAGUE
OF WOMEN VOTERS OF N.Y. ST. (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.lwvny.org/advocacy/govreform/redistricting/2011/Testimony-LATFOR080411.pdf.
4 The New York Public Interest Research Group (“NYPIRG”) is a New York State-wide
student-directed, non-partisan, not-for-profit political organization and NYPIRG advocates
the creation of an independent redistricting commission, ensuring that legislative districts are
drawn to best represent New Yorkers, rather than improve a legislator’s chances at reelection.
About NYPIRG, NYPIRG, http://www.nypirg.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
5 The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law is a non-partisan
public policy and law institute that focuses on fundamental issues of democracy and justice
and is a “leader in the fight for just and equitable redistricting procedures . . . . “ Justin Levitt,
A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/CGR%20Reprint%20Single%20Pag
e.pdf.
6 See Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.html.
7 See End Partisan Redistricting in Wisconsin, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Feb. 6,
2014),
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/opinion/end-partisan-redistricting-in-wisconsinb99199581z1-244106841.html.
8 Robert Kurfirst, Term-Limit Logic: Paradigms and Paradoxes, 29 POLITY 119, 126
(1996).
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explores the overlap between politically and racially based district
drawing. Finally, Part V examines the various restraints on
incumbency protection currently employed by the states.
II.

PARTISAN POLITICAL REDISTRICTING: THE DEBATE

Most political scientists and many legal scholars decry partisan
political gerrymandering as violative of democratic principles of fair
political competition. Partisan political gerrymandering is claimed,
ipso facto, to result in an uneven electoral playing field. It therefore is
anathema to many in the political science community who view such
partisan advantage as a dagger in the heart of the body politic. Daniel
D. Polsby, Professor of Law at Northwestern University and Robert D.
Popper, a practicing lawyer, attack partisan political gerrymandering
as antithetical to core precepts of democracy. 9 They contend that
“gerrymandering inflicts harm on democratic institutions . . . [and]
violates the American constitutional tradition by conceding to
legislatures a power of self-selection.” 10 Self-constitutive legislatures,
or self-constitutive governing institutions of any kind, make no sense
under a Constitution whose most arresting innovation was the
dispersion of power: 11 “Gerrymandering introduces a chronic, selfperpetuating skew into the business of popular representation, no
matter how the term is defined.” 12 Martin Shapiro, Professor of Law
(Emeritus) at University of California Berkeley School of Law,
denounces partisan gerrymandering as a “pathology of democracy”
and further stated that “[g]errymandering is a bad, bad thing.” 13
The late Yale University Professor Robert A. Dahl defined “a
key characteristic of democracy [as] the continuing responsiveness of
the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as
political equals” with unimpaired opportunities. 14 Dahl further
elucidates, “the rights of citizenship include the opportunity to oppose
and vote out the highest officials in the government.” 15
9 Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural
Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 302 (1991).
10 Id. at 304.
11 Id. at 304.
12 Id. at 305.
13 Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV.
227, 239, 251 (1985).
14 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971).
15 ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 220 (1989).
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Drawing on this concept, Jennifer Clark, Assistant Professor of
Political Science at The University of Houston, argues:
The redistricting process has important consequences
for voters. In some states, incumbent legislators work
together to protect their own seats, which produces less
competition in the political system . . . . Voters may feel
as though they do not have a meaningful alternative to
the incumbent legislator.
Legislators who lack
competition in their districts have less incentive to
adhere to their constituents’ opinions. 16
Andrew Gelman, Professor of Political Science at University of
California, Berkeley, and Gary King, Professor of Political Science at
Harvard University maintain that optimal partisan redistricting plans
produce a less responsive electoral system. 17
Notwithstanding the distaste of these scholars and their ilk for
partisan political gerrymandering, a viable solution is elusive. Bruce
E. Cain, Professor of Political Science, University of California,
Berkeley, concedes that the problems caused by the unfairness of
partisan gerrymandering remain unresolved and that solutions offered
by legal scholars and political science professors are either unworkable
or undoable. 18
Others, however, do not think the problem insuperable. Led by
Professor Richard Pildes of the University of Michigan Law School,
Professor Samuel Issacharoff of New York University Law School and
Professor Pamela Karlan of Stanford Law School, these academicians
16 Aaron Manuel, Redistricting Will Affect November Election, THE DAILY COUGAR, (Oct.
16, 2012), http://thedailycougar.com/2012/10/16/redistricting-will-affect-november-election/
(quotations omitted).
17 Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting,
88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 543 (1994); see also Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman,
Optimal Partisan Gerrymandering, 7 POL. GEOGRAPHY Q. 5, 12, 19 (1988).
18 For a review of Professor Cain’s criticisms of proposed solutions, see Bruce E. Cain,
Garrett’s Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1589 (1999); Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting
Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1812-13 (2012) [hereinafter
Buffer]; BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS, AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM
QUANDARY 120, 122 (2015). Countermeasures to the perceived evil of partisan redistricting
have taken the form of non-partisan drawing of districts by independent commissions and/or
term limits. Term limits, which were popular in the decade of the 1990s, attack incumbency
by limiting the number of terms a legislator may legally serve. Non-partisan redistricting,
which was the focus of the 2000’s redistricting laws, addresses the form and process of
constructing legislative districts, irrespective of the candidate. The latter measure places the
emphasis on the districts, not on the candidate. These are discussed in detail, see infra Part
IV.
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advocate attacking partisan political gerrymandering by engaging the
legal system to assure an appropriate and competitive political
environment without artificial barriers to robust political competition
such as gerrymandering. 19 Professor Issacharoff argues that:
So long as the [redistricting] process is left in the hands
of incumbent political officials whose self-interest runs
strongly to what they can get away with, and so long as
judicial oversight remains cumbersome and
unpredictable, the private interest will likely continue
to subsume the public interest.
A strategy of
reinforcing political competition by taking the process
of redistricting out of the hands of partisan officials
offers the prospect of realizing our constitutional
values. 20
A powerful rebuttal was not long in coming. In replying to
Issacharoff’s proposal to delegitimize districts drawn by self-interested
decision makers, Professor Nathaniel Persily, James B. McClatchy
Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, “disagree[s] fundamentally
. . . with almost every aspect of Issacharoff’s argument.” 21 Persily
articulates four principal points of disagreement. First, Professor
Persily disagrees with Issacharoff’s definition and assessment of the
problem he wishes to solve: “By focusing on incumbent reelection
rates and margins of victory, Issacharoff ignores evidence both of
intense competition for control of legislatures and of remarkable levels
of legislative turnover.” 22 Second, Persily maintains that “to the extent
incumbents have unfair and growing advantages over challengers,
redistricting is not to blame.” 23 Third, he argues that “the creation of
safe seats, the principal target of Issacharoff’s ire, is neither inherently
undesirable nor easily avoidable.” 24 Fourth, “the alternative that
19 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); see also SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 822 (3d ed. 2007); see also Samuel Issacharoff,
Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1650 (1993).
20 Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 64748 (2002) (footnote omitted).
21 Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymandering, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 650 (2002).
22 Id. at 650.
23 Id. at 650.
24 Id. at 650.
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Issacharoff would have the courts force upon state governments,”
namely, “redistricting by politically insulated commissions” is “both
undesirable in theory and difficult to create in fact.” 25 Persily claims
that “there is good reason to consider safe districts preferable from the
standpoint of democratic theory.” 26
As a preliminary matter, Persily notes that notwithstanding and
in spite of partisan gerrymandering, there constantly have been
significant degrees of legislative turnover, as the 1992 Congressional
elections illustrate. 27 The 1992 Congressional election occurred on the
heels of the 1990’s incumbent protective redistricting. 28 Yet, more
than one quarter of the U.S. House of Representatives were elected for
the first time. 29 Persily recounts that from 1972 through 2002, 10% to
20% of the seat holders in the House of Representatives changed with
each election and that turnover was even greater at the state legislative
level. 30
Next, Persily disputes the cause and effect relationship between
partisan redistricting and low legislative turnover. He posits that the
argument that gerrymandering of individual legislative districts results
in unacceptable incumbent reelection rates is belied by the fact that
“statewide elections unaffected by redistricting, such as elections for
governor and U.S. Senate, have shown parallel growth in rates of
incumbent reelection.” 31 Further, Persily does not agree that from the
standpoint of the electorate, low turnover translates into poor
representation. He observes that because Congress accords great
influence to representatives based on seniority, it is governmentally
beneficial to keep incumbents in office as long as possible to enhance
the seniority, and thus the influence, of a stated congressional
delegate. 32 Similarly, he argues that states have a legitimate interest
“in keeping experienced legislators in state government.” 33
Finally, Persily describes the practical difficulties of replacing
the present system with one that is purely non-partisan. 34 Obviously,
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 650.
Persily, supra note 21, at 650.
Persily, supra note 21, at 654.
Persily, supra note 21, at 657.
Persily, supra note 21, at 654.
Persily, supra note 21, at 654.
Persily, supra note 21, at 650.
Persily, supra note 21, at 650.
Persily, supra note 21, at 650.
Persily, supra note 21, at 674, 676-77.
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even members of so-called non-partisan commissions have political
biases. 35 Neither they, nor the people who choose them, are politically
immaculately conceived. Unlike formless space aliens, appointees to
so-called independent districting commissions do not spring forth
without any intention or form. As human beings, these appointees
bring to the table their own internal political predilections, experiences
and prejudices. And, the institutions and government officials who
appoint such commissioners similarly start with their own set of
political prejudices (i.e., Democrats, Republicans, Socialists, rich,
poor, et al.). 36 Persily proved to be prescient. 37
Persily is not a lone scholarly voice positing the notion that
partisan political redistricting is not necessarily a governmental evil as
Issacharoff and his fellow scholars assert. Stephen Ansolabehere,
Professor of Government at Harvard University, and James M. Snyder,
Jr., Professor of History and Political Science at Harvard University,
conclude in a recent article that, in fact, redistricting actually weakens
the incumbent advantage and helps promote turnover. 38
Professors Ansolabehere and Snyder undertook an empirical
study of five factors indicative of the impact of political control over
the districting process. 39
Their analysis shows that political
redistricting does not necessarily result in incumbent advantage. 40
First, they found that while the expectation for protection of
incumbents would dictate that districts be either overwhelmingly
Democratic or overwhelmingly Republican, statistical analysis reveals
that most districts are moderate, with little heavy skewing in favor of
one party or the other. 41 Second, because redistricting inevitably
35

Persily, supra note 21, at 659.
A challenge to the creation of an Arizona State Redistricting Commission was decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Arizona State Legislative v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). Even Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who
authored the majority opinion upholding Arizona’s delegation of redistricting responsibility
to the Commission, recognized that non-partisan redistricting is not an electoral panacea
because it hasn’t eliminated the inevitable partisan suspicions associated with political line
drawing. She invoked Berkeley’s Professor Cain in support of this proposition. Id. at 2676.
37 See Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016) (exploring a
fuller discussion on how political considerations infected the claimed non-partisan Arizona
Redistricting Commission).
38 See Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Effects of Redistricting on
Incumbents,
11
ELECTION L.J.: RULES, POL., & POL’Y 490 (2012),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11910880/19401494.pdf?sequence=1.
39 Id. at 4.
40 Id. at 4.
41 Id. at 4, 8-9.
36
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results in changes to district boundary lines, with an attendant
replacement of constituents whom the representative has served with
new, unfamiliar voters, it is unhelpful to incumbents. 42 Third, with
respect to districted offices, such as the state legislatures and the U.S.
House of Representatives, the vote share when an incumbent is
running versus the vote share when an incumbent is not running is
“much smaller” than the vote share of incumbents running for nondistricted offices, such as governor or U.S. Senate. 43 Fourth, statistics
reveal only small changes in district partisanship. Lastly, turnover was
found to be highest in redistricting years. 44 (If redistricting was in fact
co-extensive with incumbency protection the opposite would occur.)
Partisan political gerrymandering has also had other, earlier
scholarly defenders. Peter H. Schuck, Professor Emeritus of Law at
Yale School, has suggested that partisan gerrymandering in some of its
aspects could actually benefit democracy because it “reinforce[s] the
majority party’s capacity to govern alone, making it easier to attribute
responsibility for political acts,” and thus furthers the goal of party
accountability. 45 Professors Andrew Gelman and Gary King observe
that:
The political turmoil created by legislative redistricting
creates political renewal. Many of the goals sought by
proponents of term limitations are solved by legislative
redistricting. Even the reputation of the “egregious”
partisan gerrymander has been somewhat rehabilitated:
not only does redistricting perform the simple task of
getting the numbers right, but redistricting has tended
to reduce partisan bias and increase electoral
responsiveness. 46
In 2006, Emory University professors Alan Abramowitz, Brad
Alexander and Matthew Gunning wrote, “some studies have
concluded that redistricting has a neutral or positive effect on
competition . . . . [I]t is often the case that partisan redistricting has the

42

Id.at 13-14.
Ansolabehere & Snyder, Jr., supra note 38, at 4-5.
44 Ansolabehere & Snyder, Jr., supra note 38, at 5.
45 Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and the Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1361 (1987).
46 Gelman & King, supra note 17, at 554.
43

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/9

8

Chill: Political Gerrymandering

2017

POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING

803

effect of reducing the safety of incumbents, thereby making elections
more competitive.” 47
Persily wrote his rebuttal to Issacharoff in 2002. A review of
election results following the most recent spate of incumbency
protection statutes, passed after the 2010 census, buttresses Persily’s
argument that despite partisan gerrymandering both the House of
Representatives and state legislatures continue to experience
significant legislative turnover. In 2014, an average of 23% of
legislative seats in state senates turned over. In 2014, an average of
21.1% of house seats turned over. Even in large states such as
California, 25% of the senate seats turned over and 47.5% of the house
seats turned over. 48 In 2012, 65 members of the U.S. House of
Representatives did not return, a turnover rate of 15%. 49
The turnover rate would seem antithetical to the claim that
partisan gerrymandering is a major political device for incumbency
protection.
III.

JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMACY OF
INCUMBENCY PROTECTION IN REDISTRICTING

Under the U.S. Constitution, legislative districts must be
redrawn after every decennial census to ensure voting equality by
complying with the Constitutional mandate of one person, one vote. 50
Any redistricting plan must also safeguard the voting rights of minority
groups, 51 pursuant to the requirements of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and of Sections 2 and 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 52 Case law at all levels validates
incumbency protection as a legitimate state redistricting policy.

47 Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in
the U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL.75, 76 (2006) (citation omitted).
48 2014 Post-Election State Legislative Seat Turnover, NCSL: NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/2014post-election-turnover.aspx.
49 House Incumbents Retired, Defeated, or Reelected, 1946-2014, BROOKINGS 13 (2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch2_full.pdf.
50 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583-84; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8-9.
51 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973).
52 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301 (2014). ,
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A. U.S. Supreme Court Authority
In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized the
legitimacy of incumbency protection as a factor in legislative
redistricting. That incumbency protection is a valid state policy to be
taken into account in crafting a redistricting plan that flows from the
oft cited Supreme Court admonition that “[p]olitics and political
considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.”53
As the Supreme Court recognizes “redistricting in most cases will
implicate a political calculus,” the courts must accordingly “be
sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enter a legislature’s
redistricting calculus.” 54
In White v. Weiser, the Supreme Court recognized as a
legitimate redistricting goal a state policy aimed at maintaining
existing relationships between incumbent representatives and their
constituents, and preserving the seniority of the state’s congressional
delegation. 55
In Karcher v. Daggett, the Supreme Court held that
“preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between
incumbent Representatives” is a valid state redistricting policy. 56
In Abrams v. Johnson, the Supreme Court held that Georgia’s
interest in “maintaining core districts and communities of interest”
justified certain deviations in population in a plan drawn by the district
court. 57
In Bush v. Vera, the Supreme Court flatly stated: “[W]e have
recognized incumbency protection, at least in the limited form of
‘avoiding contests between incumbents,’ as a legitimate state goal . . . .
[L]egitimate districting considerations, including incumbency, can be
sustained.” 58
In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, the Supreme Court, in
a plurality opinion, recognized “incumbency protection” as a
“customary districting concern.” 59 See generally Houston Lawyers
Ass’n v. Attorney General of Texas, recognizing legitimacy of state’s
53

Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914-16 (1995).
55 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1973).
56 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (emphasis added).
57 521 U.S. 74, 76 (1997).
58 517 U.S. 952, 964-65(1996) (emphasis added) (citing Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740; White,
412 U.S. at 797; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966).
59 528 U.S. 320, 346 (2000).
54
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interest in “maintaining” an existing electoral system to preserve the
“link” between an elected official and the official’s base. 60
The Supreme Court has declined to strike down politically
motivated redistricting plans, even in cases where the evidence of
partisanship was overwhelming. 61 As recently as 2015, in Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 62 the Supreme Court listed with
approval incumbency protection as a valid race-neutral redistricting
principle. 63
B. Lower Federal Court Authority: New York State
In Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Gantt,
the court acknowledged that the redistricting criteria that properly may
be considered include “maintenance of the cores of existing districts,
communities of interest, and political fairness.” 64
In Diaz v. Silver, the court found that the “legislators[‘] . . .
quite legitimate concerns about the ability of representatives to
maintain relationships they had already developed with their
constituents,” as well as “the powerful role that seniority plays in the

60

Houston Lawyers Ass’n v. Att’y General of Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 426 (1991).
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999) (citing Bush, 517 U.S. at 968); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996); Miller, 515 U.S. at 916; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646
(1993); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (upholding a
Pennsylvania congressional redistricting plan that was challenged as a pro-Republican
gerrymander); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (upholding an Indiana legislature plan
alleged to be a partisan gerrymander); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 752 (upholding a Connecticut
legislature plan alleged to be a bipartisan gerrymander).
62 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1270 (2015).
63 By contrast, often in dissent, Justice Stevens has consistently held that partisan
gerrymandering is justiciable and unconstitutional. See Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) where
Justice Stevens stated in dissent:
Today’s plurality opinion would exempt governing officials from that
duty in the context of legislative redistricting and would give license,
for the first time, to partisan gerrymanders that are devoid of any rational
justification. In my view, when partisanship is the legislature’s sole
motivation – when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken unabashedly and
all traditional districting criteria are subverted for partisan advantage – the
governing body cannot be said to have acted impartially.
Id. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also argued that the Constitution should be
amended to prohibit political gerrymandering. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Political
Gerrymandering, in SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTION 33-55 (2014).
64 796 F. Supp. 681, 691 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (emphasis added).
61
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functioning of Congress make[ ] incumbency an important and
legitimate factor for a legislature to consider.” 65
The two decisions in Rodriguez v. Pataki, 66 involving New
York’s redistricting in the wake of the 2000 census, further illuminate
the validity of incumbency protection.
C. The Rodriguez Court Drawn Congressional Plan
After the 2000 decennial census, the New York State
Legislature initially failed to draw new congressional district lines for
use in the 2002 election. 67 A three-judge court was empaneled for
drawing a court ordered redistricting plan for New York’s
congressional delegation. The court appointed former U.S. District
Judge Frederick B. Lacey Special Master to prepare and recommend
to the court a proposed congressional redistricting plan. 68 On May 13,
2002, the Special Master filed his report with the court. 69 In that May
13, 2002 report, the Special Master acknowledged incumbency as a
factor when he specifically rejected proposed plans that paired
incumbents. 70 The court, in adopting the Special Master’s plan “in its
entirety,” inter alia, noted with approval, the plan’s respect for “ ‘the
cores of current districts and the communities of interest that have
formed around them,’ “ 71 which resulted in the separation of two
incumbents in Manhattan (Congresspersons Nadler and Maloney) so
they would not have to run against each other. 72
1. Challenge in the Rodriguez Case to Legislatively
Enacted Congressional, State, Senate and
Assembly Lines

65

978 F. Supp. 96, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
Rodriguez v. Pataki, No. 02 Civ. 618 (RMB), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9272, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2002) [hereinafter Rodriguez I]; Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Rodriguez II].
67 Rodriguez II, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 354-55.
68 Order Appointing Special Master, Rodriguez v. Pataki, 207 F. Supp. 2d 123 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
69 Rodriguez I, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9272, at *2-3.
70 Rodriguez v. Pataki, No. 02 Civ. 0618, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11782, at *63 (S.D.N.Y.
May 13, 2002).
71 Rodriguez I, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9272, at *2, *20.
72 Id. at *20-21.
66
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The Rodriguez plaintiffs, who included African-American,
Hispanic, and Caucasian New York voters, asserted a further claim
against Governor Pataki and other state officials (before the same
three-judge federal court) seeking to overturn the congressional and
legislative lines adopted by the state legislature following Rodriguez
I. 73 After a lengthy trial, the court, on March 15, 2004, handed down
a 211 page decision (“Rodriguez II”) dismissing all claims against the
legislatively enacted Congressional, Senate and Assembly district
lines. 74
One of the grounds constituting the basis for the challenge in
Rodriguez II was the claim of partisan gerrymandering, which the
court rejected, noting that “‘preserving the cores of prior districts,’”
and “‘avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives’” are
“‘important state policies’” in redistricting. 75
Another ground on which the Rodriguez II challenge rested
was the population deviation among the legislative districts. As to that
claim, the Rodriguez court:
[D]enied the defendants’ initial motion to dismiss . . .
the Complaint, . . . to give the plaintiffs an opportunity
to meet their burden to show that the minimal deviation
results solely from an unconstitutional or irrational state
purpose rather than from other state policies recognized
by the Supreme Court to be appropriate reasons for
deviations. Such policies, announced in Karcher,
include “making districts compact, respecting
municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior
districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent
representatives.” 76
In finding that the population deviation in the plan at issue was justified
by, inter alia, the need to protect incumbents, the court held: “The plan
promotes the traditional principles of maintaining the core of districts
and limiting incumbent pairing.” 77

73

Rodriguez II, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
Id. at 351-52.
75 Id. at 363, 366 (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740)
76 Rodriguez II, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 366 (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740) (emphasis
added).
77 Rodriguez II, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 370 (emphasis omitted).
74
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Finally, the Rodriguez II court specifically endorsed that part
of the state senate plan drawn to “avoid[ ] [a] partisan reconfiguration
against [incumbent] Sen[ator] Velella . . . . “ 78
D. Lower Federal Court Authority: States Other Than
New York
In South Carolina State Conference of Branches of NAACP v.
Riley, the court stated the following about incumbency protection
embodied in the plan it drew:
Any new plan should alter the old only insofar as
necessary to obtain an acceptable result. Incumbents
know their constituents in the old districts, and many of
those constituents will know their congressman as “my
congressman.” Many of the constituents would have
been served by the congressman in ways calculated to
obtain and enhance loyal support. Such voters ought
not to be deprived of the opportunity to vote for a
candidate that has served them well in the past and to
enjoy his continued representation of them. Supporters
and opponents, alike, have a basis for judging him. 79
In Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, the court
found:
The court [plan] also should avoid unnecessary or
invidious outdistricting of incumbents. Unless
outdistricting is required by the Constitution or the
Voting Rights Act, the maintenance of incumbents
provides the electorate with some continuity. The
voting population within a particular district is able to
maintain its relationship with its particular
representative and avoids accusations of political
gerrymandering. 80

78

Id. at 459.
533 F. Supp. 1178, 1180-81 (D.S.C.) (per curiam), aff’d sub nom. Stevenson v. South
Carolina State Conference of Branches of NAACP, Inc., 459 U.S. 1025 (1982).
80 828 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D. Ariz. 1992), aff’d sub nom. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
v. Arizonans for Fair Representation, 507 U.S. 981 (1993) (citation omitted).
79
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In Prosser v. Elections Board, the court drawn plan lacked
incumbent pairings thereby creating the least “perturbation in the
political balance of the state.” 81
In Colleton County Council v. McConnell, the court, in
articulating the traditional redistricting principles that guided the courtdrawn plan, stated that “[m]aintaining the residences of the
incumbents” to protect “the core constituency’s interest in reelecting,
if they choose, an incumbent representative in whom they have placed
their trust,” was a “worthy” redistricting consideration. 82
In Smith v. Clark, the court included “protection of incumbent
residences” as a factor to be considered in drawing of court-ordered
plan because “maintenance of incumbents provides the electorate with
some continuity.” 83 In discussing its plan, the court acknowledged its
design to protect incumbents. 84
In short, judicial approval for legislatively enacted districts
designed to effect incumbency protection is overwhelming throughout
the United States court system. In any event, although the Supreme
Court in Davis v. Bandemer, 85 held claims of partisan gerrymandering
to be technically justiciable, 86 in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 87 and League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 88 the Supreme Court decided
that because a manageable standard for determining excessive
partisanship could not be found, court intervention in political
gerrymandering cases would be improper. 89
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

793 F. Supp. 859, 871 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 647 (D.S.C. 2002).
189 F. Supp. 2d 529, 541, 545 (S.D. Miss. 2002)
Id. at 545.
478 U.S. 109 (1986).
Id. at 143.
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.
548 U.S. 399, 413-14, 423 (2006).

89

For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of Davis v. Bandemer and Vieth v.
Jubelirer, see Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing: Deriving &
Measuring Fairness in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1564-66 (2005); however,
see Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160811, at *3 (D.
Wis. Nov. 21, 2016) (holding that the Wisconsin Legislature’s 2011 redrawing of
State Assembly districts to favor Republicans was an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander, the first such ruling in three decades of pitched legal battles over the
issue). On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gill v. Whitford.
The court set forth the following issues: (1) whether the district court violated Vieth
v. Jubelirer when it held that it had the authority to entertain a statewide challenge
to Wisconsin’s redistricting plan, instead of requiring a district-by-district analysis;
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PARTISANSHIP AND RACE BASED REDISTRICTING

In 1965, the United States Congress passed The Voting Rights
Act of 1965, which was signed into law by President Lyndon B.
Johnson.90
The Act provides nationwide voting protections for minority
voters. Section 2 of the Act is a provision that prohibits every state
and local government from imposing any voting law that results in
discrimination against racial or language minorities. 91 Other general

(2) whether the district court violated Vieth when it held that Wisconsin’s
redistricting plan was an impermissible partisan gerrymander, even though it was
undisputed that the plan complies with traditional redistricting principles; (3)
whether the district court violated Vieth by adopting a watered-down version of the
partisan-gerrymandering test employed by the plurality in Davis v. Bandemer; (4)
whether the defendants are entitled, at a minimum, to present additional evidence
showing that they would have prevailed under the district court’s test, which the court
announced only after the record had closed; and (5) whether partisan-gerrymandering
claims are justiciable. On June 19, 2017, the court in a 5-4 decision granted a stay
of the lower court decision pending disposition of the appeal in the Supreme Court.
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/todays-orders-court-tackle-partisangerrymandering/; Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161 (S. Ct. June 19, 2017).
90 Voting Rights Act, supra note 52. The Act was later amended five times to expand its
protections. Voting Rights Act, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/votingrights-act (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).
91 The Voting Rights Act provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color,
or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of
this title, as provided in subsection (b).

(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided,
[t]hat nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
Voting Rights Act, supra note 52.
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provisions specifically outlaw literacy tests and similar devises that
historically were used to disenfranchise racial minorities.
Another important provision of the Act is the Section 5
preclearance requirement, which prohibits certain jurisdictions from
implementing any change affecting voting without receiving
preapproval from either the U.S. Attorney General or the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia that the voting change does not
derogate protected minorities. 92 Section 5 applies to jurisdictions
encompassed by the “coverage formula” prescribed in Section 4(b). 93
The coverage formula was originally designed to embrace jurisdictions
that engaged in egregious voting discrimination in 1965.94 The
constitutionality of the Act was upheld in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach. 95 However, in Shelby County v. Holder, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down the coverage formula as unconstitutional,
reasoning that it was no longer responsive to current conditions. 96 The
Court did not strike down Section 5, but without a coverage formula,
Section 5 is toothless. 97
The essence of Section 2 of the Act requires that districts be
drawn in a manner that preserves the ability of minorities to elect
preferred candidates of their choice. 98 The Act specifically addressed
two separate methods of disenfranchising minorities, cracking and
packing. Cracking was a method used to disenfranchise minorities by
dividing minority population concentrations into two separate districts,
which prevented minorities from constituting a majority in either
district. 99 Packing involved cramming so many minority voters into
one district so it reduces their voting strength in surrounding
Since concentration and/or dispersal of protected
districts. 100
minorities are impermissible, race conscious redistricting is required
in order to avoid running afoul of the Act.

92

52 U.S.C.A. § 10304(a) (2006).
52 U.S.C.A. § 10303(b) (2006).
94 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013).
95 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966).
96 Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2629.
97 Id. at 2622.
98 Id. at 2621.
99 See David Lublin, Race & Redistricting in the United States: An Overview, in
REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 141, 144 (Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman
eds., 2008) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE].
100 Id.
93
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In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court held that a Section
2 violation may occur by reason of the failure to construct an
appropriate district for a protected minority where plaintiffs can
establish three preconditions: “the minority group must be”
(a) ”sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district;” (b) ”politically cohesive;” and
(c) usually unable to elect its preferred candidate due to white-bloc
voting. 101 Accordingly, the existence of those circumstances may
require that a redistricting plan create corresponding majority minority
districts. 102
Since minorities vote overwhelmingly for Democrats, districts
in which they are placed will have a partisan slant as the extent to
which a district comprises minority populations will have a substantial
effect on whether the district elects a Democratic legislator or a
Republican legislator. Accordingly, there is inevitably a political
calculus in drawing Voting Rights districts for protected minorities,
albeit under the rubric of racial redistricting considerations. 103
The Supreme Court in Harris v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission vividly illustrates this point. 104 In 2014,
Arizona voters brought a lawsuit contending that the Arizona so-called
non-partisan Independent Redistricting Commission violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution in drawing Arizona
legislative lines that favor Democrats. 105 The complaint, inter alia,
claimed that gaining partisan advantage for one political party by
systemically overpopulating sixteen Republican districts while under
populating eleven Democratic districts so as to favor Democrats is not
a legislative function sufficient to justify deviation from the
constitutional one-person, one-vote prerogative. 106

101

478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
See Lublin, supra note 99, at 144; Bartlett v. Strickland, 566 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2009)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (confirming that only communities that can form over 50% of a
district’s relevant population have viable Section 2 claims).
103 See Thomas Brunell & Bernard Grofman, The Partisan Consequences of Baker v. Carr
and the One Person, One Vote Revolution, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 99, 225,
227-29, 232-33. On December 5, 2016, the Supreme Court heard Oral Arguments for
Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017) and McCrory v. Harris,
137 S. Ct. 458 (2016).
104 Harris, 136 S. Ct. 1301.
105 Id. at 1307
106 Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (D. Ariz.
2014).
102
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The three-judge district court found the commission
malapportioned Arizona’s legislature for two reasons: (1) the desire to
give the Democratic party a political advantage; and (2) because the
commission’s lawyer and consultant said that the Justice Department
would not preclear the reapportionment scheme under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act unless the commission underpopulated eleven
districts to create (or to attempt to create) minority “ability-to-elect”
districts. 107 Two of the three district judges upheld the commission’s
unequal reapportionment plan on the ground that the Justice
Department required unequally populated districts to obtain
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act, even though they
recognized that there was some partisanship involved. 108 Relying on
the district court’s finding that the “population deviations were
primarily a result of good-faith efforts to comply with the Voting
Rights Act,” the Supreme Court upheld the redistricting plan,
notwithstanding that most Democratic districts were underpopulated
and almost all Republican district were overpopulated. 109 In its
decision the Supreme Court expressly recognized that “partisanship
played some role” and that “the tendency of minority populations in
Arizona . . . [was] to vote disproportionately for Democrats.” 110 It
nevertheless unanimously affirmed the decision below.
The Supreme Court has observed: “Our . . . decisions have
made clear that a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political
gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats
happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of
that fact.” 111 And as Harris demonstrates, partisan line drawing of
districts (political gerrymandering) is a de facto byproduct of carrying
out the purposes of the Voting Rights Act, sanctioned by the Supreme
Court. 112

107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1046.
Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1309.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 551 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 551-52.
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THE VARIOUS RESTRAINTS ON INCUMBENCY USED BY THE
STATES 113

State legislatures drew new congressional districts in forty-two
states and legislative districts in thirty-seven states. 114 Since the
legislature will obviously protect the seats of its own existing
members, the districts drawn in those states undoubtedly will be
designed for maximum partisan incumbency protection.
A. Redistricting Commissions
Arizona and California are the only states that have
independent bodies that take the redistricting process wholly out of the
hands of the legislature.
The California Citizens Redistricting Commission 115 is the
redistricting organization for the state of California. It is responsible
for determining the boundaries for the Senate, Assembly, and Board of
The fourteen-member
Equalization districts in the state. 116
commission consists of five Democrats, five Republicans, and four
commissioners from neither major party. 117 The commission was
authorized following the passage of California Proposition 11, 118 the
Voters First Act, by voters in November 2008. The commissioners
were selected in November and December 2010 and were required to
complete new maps by August 15, 2011. 119
Following the 2010 passage of California Proposition 20, 120 the
Voters First Act for Congress, the Commission was also assigned the
responsibility of redrawing the state’s U.S. congressional district

113

For a comprehensive overview of the many different governmental institutions that
participate in effecting redistricting throughout the 50 states, see Brief for National Conference
of State Legislatures as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (No. 13-1314) [hereinafter Brief
for National Conference of State Legislatures]. See also Cain, Buffer, supra note 18.
114 Who Draws the Lines?, LOY. L. SCH.: L.A., http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php (last
visited Apr. 28, 2017).
115 What’s New, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/
(last visited Apr. 29, 2017).
116 FAQ, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/
faq.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2017).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2 (amended 2010).
120 Id.
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boundaries necessitated by the 2010 United States Census. The
Commission works as follows:
The commission on appellate court appointees creates
a pool of 25 nominees, ten from each of the two largest
parties and five not from either of the two largest
parties. The highest ranking officer of the [H]ouse
appoints one from the pool, then the minority leader of
the [H]ouse appoints one, then the highest-ranking
officer of the [S]enate appoints one, then the minority
leader of the [S]enate appoints one. These four appoint
a fifth from the pool, not a member of any party already
represented on the commission, as chair. If the four
deadlock, the commission on appellate court
appointments appoints the chair. 121
Arizona’s Independent Redistricting Commission 122 (AIRC)
draws both congressional and legislative districts. An amicus brief by
the National Conference of State Legislatures in Arizona State
Legislative v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission provides
a good description of the AIRC:
The AIRC originated in 2000, when Arizona’s voters
approved Proposition 106, which amended the state
constitution by ‘removing congressional redistricting
authority from the Legislature and vesting that
authority in the AIRC.’ The AIRC has five independent
members. The commissioners are selected from an
original pool of twenty-five candidates. The twentyfive candidates must include ten from each of the two
largest political parties in the state and five who are not
registered with either party. The candidates are
selected not by the state legislature or any of its
members; instead, they are selected by the Arizona state
commission on appellate court appointments, which
does not include any legislators among its members.
Each of the four legislative leaders then chooses one
121 Appendix F: Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, SENATE MN,
https://www.senate.mn/departments/scr/REDIST/Red2000/apfcomco.htm (last visited Apr.
30, 2017).
122 Arizona
Independent
Redistricting
Commission:
Mission,
AZ.GOV,
http://www.azredistricting.org/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
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commissioner from the pre-selected list of 25
candidates. The four commissioners chosen by the
legislative leaders then select the fifth commissioner,
who may not be registered in the same party as any of
the four commissioners. 123
In Arizona, the legislative leaders must pick from a pre-selected list of
candidates, which effectively prevents the legislature from picking the
commissioners of its choice. 124
The Republican-controlled Arizona Legislature brought a legal
challenge against Arizona’s commission in 2012, arguing it was
unconstitutional to strip lawmakers of a voice in redistricting. 125 They
relied on the Constitution’s elections clause, which says that the time,
place, and manner in holding congressional elections “shall be
prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof.” 126 The Supreme
Court’s four liberals, and Justice Anthony Kennedy, rejected that
argument, saying the clause could not be read to preclude voter
initiatives that seek an alternative way of redistricting. 127
In five other states (Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Jersey, and
Washington) boards appointed by the legislatures (not from a
predetermined list) draw the lines in place of the legislature. 128 Since
the legislature picks the members effectuating the final maps, these
politician-appointed boards, which are not non-partisan, inevitably

123

Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 15-17.
Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 15-17.
125 See Arizona, 135 S. Ct. at 2658-59; Amber Phillips, The Supreme Court’s Ruling in
Favor of Redistricting Commissions, Explained, WASH. POST (June 29, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/06/29/the-supreme-courts-ruling-infavor-of-redistricting-commissions-explained/?utm_term=.eec7d95e9362.
126 Arizona, 135 S. Ct. at 2658-59.
127 In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court ruled the
Constitution allowed Arizona voters to take line-drawing authority away from state lawmakers
and give that to an independent commission. Id. at 2657. In that 2000 ballot initiative,
Arizonans “sought to restore ‘the core principle of republican government,’ namely, ‘that the
voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around.’ “ Id. at 2677. The four
most conservative justices dissented, saying the Court ignored clear constitutional language
that gives state legislatures power to draw district lines. Id. at 2678 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
For example, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in dissent, “[n]o matter how concerned we may
be about partisanship in redistricting, this Court has no power to gerrymander the
Constitution.” Id. at 2678 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
128 Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 10.
124
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produce districts desired by the legislators and incorporate incumbency
protection districts. 129

129 See Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 10; Cain,
Buffer, supra note 18, at 1820.
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Four states (Iowa, 130 New York, 131 Ohio, 132 and Maine133) have
advisory commissions that advise the legislature through the
mechanism of advisory reports or suggestions, or even propose maps,

130 Iowa has a five-member advisory commission; however, if the legislature rejects the
commission’s plan three times, the legislature is free to enact its own plan. See IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 42.3, 42.5 (West 2014).
131 In 2011, New York good-government groups engaged in a vigorous effort to achieve
non-partisan redistricting. For example, NY Uprising was a nonpartisan coalition of goodgovernment groups founded by former New York City Mayor Ed Koch for the purpose of
promoting independent nonpartisan redistricting in New York State in connection with the
2011 redistricting cycle. NY Uprising, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/NY_Uprising
(last visited Apr. 30, 2017). Such article stated that “[d]uring the 2010 elections, NY Uprising
sought pledges from candidates supporting independent redistricting . . . . Those who signed
the pledge were referred to by NY Uprising as ‘Heroes of Reform,’ while those that did not
were called ‘Enemies of Reform.’ “ Id. Notwithstanding that 350 candidates, including those
eventually elected to the legislature, signed the pledge, they did not succeed in effecting a
totally nonpartisan redistricting commission. Id.Many of the same institutions and persons
who were part of the NY Uprising movement were also part of a parallel movement called
ReShape New York: “ReShape New York is a nonpartisan coalition of 30 good-government
groups working for redistricting reform in New York. Their goal is a fair and independent
process to draw state legislature and congressional district maps.” ReShapeNY, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/ReShapeNY (last visited April 30, 2017).Instead, New York, by means
of a legislatively-referred constitutional amendment, adopted an advisory commission which
functioned as follows: The commission includes ten members, eight of whom are “appointed
by the four leaders of the state legislature.” See Brief for National Conference of State
Legislatures, supra note 113, at 7. Those eight “then appoint the final two members of the
commission.” See Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 7. If
the legislature rejects the commission’s plan twice, the legislature is free to enact its own plan.
See Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 8; N.Y. CONST. art.
III, §§ 4, 5-b.
132 Ohio has a six-member advisory commission, but the Ohio State Legislature draws
congressional district boundaries. Legislative boundaries are also drawn by a politically
dominated commission comprising the following seven members:
1. Governor
2. State auditor
3. Secretary of State
4. One commissioner chosen by the speaker of the House in concert with his or her
party’sleader in the Senate.
5. One commissioner chosen by the House minority leader along with his party’s leader in
the Senate.
6. “One person appointed by the president of the senate”; and
7. “One person appointed by the legislative leader of the largest political party in the senate
of which the president of the senate is not a member.”
See OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 103.51 (West 2014).
Consequently, Ohio congressional lines and legislative lines are drawn by a partisan rather
than by a non-partisan process.
133 Maine has a commission comprising 15 members. The legislature can override the
commission’s plans and enact a plan, of its own, but only by a 2/3 vote. See ME. CONST. art.
IV, pt. 3, § 1-A (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 1206 (West 2014).
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but the legislature retains ultimate power to set the contours of the new
districts, enabling the legislature to protect incumbents.
Finally, two states (Connecticut and Indiana) have backup
commissions that prepare the redistricting only after a state legislature
has failed to complete congressional redistricting on its own. In
Indiana, the backup commission prepares the congressional plan
only; 134 in Connecticut, the backup commission draws both the
congressional and legislative plans. 135
Although political science Professor Cain favors independent
commissions generally, he nevertheless notes that independent
commissions, even those such as in California or Arizona, are not
entirely free from partisan incumbency influence. 136 He recommends
incorporating the New Jersey bargaining system into the independent
commission system because New Jersey has a tiebreaking member
within its system. 137 In New Jersey, the members of the commission
for drawing congressional lines are appointed by the two majority and
minority party leaders plus the two chairs of the state Democratic and
Republican parties, each of whom get two selections. 138 The thirteenth
or tiebreaking member is chosen by the other twelve or by the state
supreme court if the members cannot agree. 139
B. Term Limits
Term limits attack incumbents by limiting the number of terms
a legislator can serve. 140 It was a popular anti-incumbency weapon in
the 1990s, but had no effect on Congress and limited effect on state
legislatures. 141
1. Congress
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that states cannot impose qualifications for prospective members
134

IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (West 2014).
CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6.
136 Cain, Buffer, supra note 18, at 1832-33.
137 Cain, Buffer, supra note 18, at 1808, 1838.
138 Cain, Buffer, supra note 18, at 1838
139 Cain, Buffer, supra note 18, at 1838.
140 See The Term-Limited States, NCSL: NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 13,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx
(last visited Apr. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Term-Limited States].
141 See Jim Argue, Jr., Term Limits: Panacea or Snake Oil?, 28 ARK. LAW. 47, 47-48. See
also Term-Limited States, supra note 150; Term Limits in the United States, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/ Term_limits_in_the_United_States (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
135
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of the U.S. Congress stricter than those specified in the Constitution.142
The decision invalidated the Congressional term limit provisions of
twenty-three states. 143
In Thornton, Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution
denied ballot access to any federal Congressional candidate having
already served three terms in the U.S. House or two terms in the U.S.
Senate. 144 A member of the League of Women Voters sued in state
court to have it invalidated. 145 She alleged that the new restrictions
amounted to an unwarranted expansion of the specific qualifications
for membership in Congress enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.146
Both the trial court and the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed, declaring
Amendment 73 unconstitutional. 147
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed by a 5-4 vote. 148 Writing for
the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens held that:
Finally, state-imposed restrictions, unlike the
congressionally imposed restrictions at issue in Powell,
violate a third idea central to this basic principle: that
the right to choose representatives belongs not to the
States, but to the people . . . . Following the adoption of
the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, this ideal was
extended to elections for the Senate. The Congress of
the United States, therefore, is not a confederation of
nations in which separate sovereigns are represented by
appointed delegates, but is instead a body composed of
representatives of the people. 149
He further opined that sustaining Amendment 73 would result
in “a patchwork of state qualifications” for U.S. Representatives, and
described that consequence as inconsistent with “the uniformity and
national character that the Framers . . . sought to ensure.” 150

142

514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Blocks Term Limits for Congress in a 5-4 Decision,
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/23/us/high-court-blocks-termlimits-for-congress-in-a-5-4-decision.html?pagewanted=all.
144 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 784.
145 Id. at 784-85.
146 Id. at 786.
147 Id. at 783.
148 Id. at 838.
149 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 820-21.
150 Id. at 822.
143
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Concurring, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that the amendment
would interfere with the “relationship between the people of the Nation
and their National Government.” 151
2. State Legislatures
While U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton blocked term limits
for Congress, there is no similar legal bar precluding the imposition of
term limits on state legislatures. The following fifteen state
legislatures have term limits: 152
State

Limited: Terms
(total years allowed)

Arizona

House: 4 terms (8 years)
Senate: 4 terms (8 years)

Arkansas

House: 3 terms (6 years)
Senate: 2 terms (8 years)

California

12 year cumulative total
for either or both houses.

Colorado

House: 4 terms (8 years)
Senate: 2 terms (8 years)

Florida

House: 4 terms (8 years)
Senate: 2 terms (8 years)

Louisiana

House: 3 terms (12 years)
Senate: 3 terms (12 years)

Maine

House: 4 terms (8 years)
Senate: 4 terms (8 years)

151 Id. at 845 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (countering the
majority opinion by stating: “[i]t is ironic that the Court bases today’s decision on the right of
the people to ‘choose whom they please to govern them.’ Under our Constitution, there is
only one State whose people have the right to ‘choose whom they please’ to represent
Arkansas in Congress . . . . Nothing in the Constitution deprives the people of each State of
the power to prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them
in Congress. The Constitution is simply silent on this question. And where the Constitution
is silent, it raises no bar to action by the States or the people.”) (internal citations omitted).
152 State Legislative Term Limits, U.S. TERM LIMITS, http://termlimits.org/term-limits/stateterm-limits/state-legislative-term-limits/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
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State

Limited: Terms
(total years allowed)

Michigan

House: 3 terms (6 years)
Senate: 2 terms (8 years)

Missouri

House: 4 terms (8 years)
Senate: 2 terms (8 years)

Montana

House: 4 terms (8 years)
Senate: 2 terms (8 years)

Nebraska

Unicameral: 2 terms (8 years)

Nevada

Assembly: 6 terms (12 years)
Senate:
3 terms (12 years)

Ohio

House: 4 terms (8 years)
Senate: 2 terms (8 years)

Oklahoma

12 year combined total for both houses

South Dakota

House: 4 terms (8 years)
Senate: 2 terms (8 years)

Professor Robert Kurfirst explores the reasoning behind
proposals for term limits and concludes that although “all supporters
believe that high legislative incumbency rates are unacceptable,” they
do not share similar motivations. 153 Kurfirst divides the prevailing
theories into four groups: “Progressives,” “Populists,” “Republicans,”
and “Libertarians.” 154
Progressives value professionalism in politics. By eliminating
“seniority” and candidates’ reliance “upon securing the financial
resources necessary for reelection,” 155 term limits act as an
immunization from corruption.
Populists value “responsive and efficient legislatures” above
156
all. As such, populists encourage an “influx of ordinary citizens” in
order to infuse legislatures with “fresh perspectives and uncalloused
outlooks . . . .” 157

153
154
155
156
157

Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 119.
Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 119.
Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 123.
Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 123.
Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 124.
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Republicanism within term-limit logic views “political
distance” as necessary to both allow for the functioning of the
“deliberate process” and preserve the “government’s authority.” 158
Libertarians see two benefits of term-limits: “they would
eliminate both the votes and the leadership influence of the most prospending members.” 159
Professor Edward J. Lopez, BB&T Distinguished Professor of
Capitalism at Western Carolina University, articulates two reasons for
term limits.160 First, higher tenure buttresses a legislature’s inefficient
big government (high spending). 161 Second, higher tenure creates
inefficient (anti-competitive) conditions in the legislative election
market. 162
Associate Professor at University of California, San Francisco,
D.E. Apollonio and Assistant Professor of Political Science University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, Raymond J. La Raja opt for a more
quantitative than theoretical analysis of the effects of term limits on
legislatures. 163 Apollonio and La Raja use a cross-state comparison of
the power of legislators before and after term limits were imposed. 164
Their analysis found that term limits were able to decrease power in
state legislatures by both decreasing average financial contributions to
legislators and reducing the power of caucus leaders relative to other
party members. 165 However, these changes are more apparent in the
lower chambers than in the upper chambers. 166
Professor H. Abbie Erler, Associate Professor of Political
Science, Kenyon College, details some of the reasons favoring term
limits advanced by various academicians. 167 Professor Erler states, for
one thing:
158

Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 125.
Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 126.
160 See Edward J. Lopez, Term Limits: Causes and Consequences, 114 PUB.
CHOICE 1, 1 (2003).
161 Id. at 1.
162 Id. at 1, 47 (acknowledging the need for further research to determine the
veracity of pro-term limits advocacy).
163 See D. E. Appollonio & Raymond J. La Raja, Term Limits, Campaign
Contributions, and the Distribution of Power in State Legislatures, 31 LEGIS. STUD.
Q. 259 (2006).
164 Id. at 259.
165 Id. at 267.
166 Id. at 274.
167 See H. Abbie Erler, Legislative Term Limits and State Spending, 133 PUB.
CHOICE 479 (2007).
159
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[T]erm limits will remedy the problem of adverse
selection by facilitating the election of citizenlegislators. Supporters of term limits see citizenlegislators as the antithesis of the professionalized
politicians who have come to dominate state
legislatures.
Unlike their professionalized peers,
citizen-legislators have no desire to make careers out of
service in the government. 168
Further Professor Erler went on to state that “term limits will
put an end to the ‘culture of spending’ that pervades state legislatures.
According to this view, legislators do not necessarily enter office with
pro-spending preferences but, over time, develop these preferences as
they become immersed in the process of governing.” 169
Einer R. Elhauge, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School,
similarly lauded the merits of term limits. 170 He disagreed with those
who argued that term limits “seemed to have no redeeming
prodemocratic virtue; if most voters wanted to replace experienced
incumbents with newcomers, they could do so without term limits.
Just vote the bums out.” 171 Professor Elhauge concluded:
There are compelling reasons to believe term limits
help the electorate register its political preferences
more accurately. Term limits reduce collective action
pressures to vote for a senior incumbent to gain a higher
share of legislative clout. And term limits lower entry
barriers that keep out challengers. Both effects would
likely reduce the ideological divergence between
electorates and their representatives. 172
VI.

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding that partisan gerrymandering is both
politically unfair and governmentally distasteful to many, elimination
of the partisan gerrymandering phenomenon seems improbable.
168

Id. at 480.
Id. at 480-81.
170 See Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, U. CHI. L. REV. 83,85
(1997).
171 Id. at 85.
172 Elhauge, supra note 180, at 193 (emphasis added).
169
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Undoubtedly, the primary reason for the failure to reform the
districting process can be understood as resulting from the fact that the
real voters and not academicians, legal scholars, newspapers and good
government groups, generally like their representatives and do not
wish to dispense with them.
In 2011, LATFOR conducted more than a dozen public
hearings in different geographic locations in the State of New York for
the purpose of soliciting the public’s view in respect of any proposed
2012 redistricting plans. 173 The author, who was redistricting counsel
for the New York State Assembly at that time, attended those public
hearings and spoke with witnesses who, even after publicly excoriating
partisan gerrymandering, urged that their congressional districts be
drawn in a manner that kept the same voters in the new districts.
With respect to restraints on incumbency there appears to be a
clear disconnect between theoretical distaste for incumbency
protection and the continued popularity of keeping incumbents in
power when actual, real elections are impacted. 174 In such cases, there
is a NIMBY (not in my backyard) phenomenon operating. Voters want
term limits or non-partisan redistricting so long as it does not hurt the
ability of their representative to be re-elected. 175 In other words, term
limits and/or nonpartisan redistricting are good in theory, but not in
practice.

173

See Transcripts, N.Y. LEGIS. TASK FORCE ON DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH &
REAPPORTIONMENT, http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/transcripts/ (last visited Apr. 30,
2017).
174 Persily, supra note 21, at 670 (arguing that voters’ connections with their own
representatives, not gerrymandering, are the principal reasons incumbents get reelected).
175 Kong-Pin Chen & Emerson M.S. Niou, Term Limits as a Response to
Incumbency Advantage, 67 J. POL. 390 (2005) (noting the paradox that supports
this dichotomy, namely voters choose to re-elect their incumbents while
simultaneously supporting term limits).
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